If explorers can obtain useful resources locally, they may not need to transport every kilogram from Earth. That could make sustained lunar operations more practical and reduce the cost of missions deeper into space.
The south pole also contains areas that receive relatively long periods of sunlight, making them attractive locations for solar power.
These advantages create a problem: the most useful lunar sites may be limited. Countries cannot legally claim them as sovereign territory, but missions operating there will need safety zones, landing corridors and protection from harmful interference.
If one country establishes infrastructure first, later arrivals may have to work around it. A nation could gain practical control without declaring legal ownership.
This is why statements about possessing the Moon attract serious attention even when they have no formal legal effect.
Can anyone own lunar resources?
The Outer Space Treaty clearly prohibits countries from appropriating the Moon itself. The status of resources extracted from the Moon is more complicated.
The United States has taken the position that companies may own resources they lawfully obtain from celestial bodies without owning the celestial body itself.
A comparison is sometimes made with fishing in international waters. A fishing company does not own the ocean, but it may own fish legally removed from it. Supporters of commercial space mining argue that lunar resources could be treated similarly.
Critics respond that space resources are not ordinary commodities and that extensive extraction could undermine the treaty’s commitment to using space for the benefit of all countries. They worry that wealthy states and corporations could capture the most valuable locations before less-developed nations have the ability to participate.
In 2020, during Trump’s first administration, the United States introduced the Artemis Accords. These are nonbinding political commitments intended to guide peaceful and responsible civil space exploration.
The accords address transparency, interoperability, emergency assistance, preservation of historic sites, resource extraction and the avoidance of harmful interference. NASA says the commitments reinforce participating countries’ obligations under the Outer Space Treaty.
By August 31, 2026, Türkiye had become the 71st country to sign, according to NASA’s Artemis Accords page.
The growing number of signatories gives the United States significant influence over emerging norms. Yet the accords do not give America ownership of the Moon, and not every spacefaring nation accepts the U.S. interpretation of resource rights.
Bases are not colonies—but they can create influence
Future lunar bases will raise legal and political questions that the treaties of the 1960s did not answer in detail.
A base requires power, communications, storage, transportation routes and access to nearby resources. Its operators will need to prevent other spacecraft from landing dangerously close or interfering with equipment.
The Artemis Accords discuss “safety zones” as a method of coordinating activities and avoiding harmful interference. In principle, such zones are temporary operational measures rather than territorial claims.
In practice, the boundary may become difficult to maintain.
Imagine that a country builds a habitat near a valuable ice deposit. It establishes a safe landing area, places power systems around the site and asks others to avoid operations that could spread dust or damage machinery. Each individual request may be reasonable.
Over time, however, the arrangement could begin to resemble exclusive control.
A country would not need to call the site its territory if its infrastructure made it difficult for anyone else to use the area.
This is sometimes described as the difference between de jure ownership and de facto control. The first exists under law; the second emerges from physical capacity and circumstances.
“The Moon Is Ours” is legally wrong if interpreted as a sovereignty claim. As an expression of the desire to establish practical leadership, it is far more consequential.
Space exploration is also a security issue
NASA is a civilian agency, but space has always had a military dimension.
Satellites support communications, navigation, weather forecasting, missile warning, surveillance and financial transactions. Modern armed forces depend heavily on space-based systems.
The United States created the Space Force during Trump’s first term in 2019. Its mission concerns military operations in space, not the annexation of celestial bodies. Nevertheless, its existence reflects a world in which space is considered a strategic domain.
The area between Earth and the Moon—often called cislunar space—may become increasingly important as government and commercial activity expands. Tracking spacecraft, protecting communications and maintaining awareness of distant objects will be important for both civilian safety and national security.
No evidence in Trump’s post established that the United States planned to militarily seize the Moon. International law also restricts military activity on celestial bodies, including prohibiting military bases, weapons testing and maneuvers there.
But the broader language of American dominance in space cannot be separated entirely from security competition.
Countries are not racing only to conduct science. They are also seeking technological advantage and the ability to protect their own space systems.